The lightning-fast collapse of the Assad regime in Syria has sent shockwaves throughout the Middle East. The handling of a dictator whose family has ruled the country with an iron fist for more than half a century could trigger a dramatic shift in the balance of power in the region.
But there are important impacts beyond Syria and its neighbors as well—Russia is among the countries worst affected.
As early as 2015, the Assad regime was on the verge of collapse. It was saved by Russian intervention, backed by Iran and Hezbollah. Russia launched it against the backdrop of the growing threat from the Islamic State, enabling the Assad regime to push back other rebels as well.
Over the next few years, it allowed Assad to consolidate control over the capital and other major cities, especially along the coast where Russia has two military bases.
The future of these bases is now uncertain. Russia’s Tartus naval base, which dates back to Soviet times, and the Khmeimim air base southeast of Latakia established in 2015, are part of Russia’s effort to project military power in the Mediterranean and support the Kremlin’s claims to Russian sovereignty. important assets.
Given the importance of Russian bases and the massive investments made over the years to support the regime, Assad’s fall severely affects Russia’s ability to exert credible influence on the global stage.
Even if Russia manages to reach an agreement with Syria’s new rulers over the future of its military bases, the fact that Moscow cannot save a key ally like Assad exposes a key weakness in Russia’s ability to act, not just talk. strength.
Apparent intelligence failures either missed or misunderstood the buildup of anti-Assad forces in Qatar, and Türkiye’s tacit support for it. These failures were compounded by the subsequent dwindling of Russian military assets in Syria and the inability to reinforce them on short notice. Of course, this is due to Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine.
The depletion of the military capabilities of the Kremlin’s two other allies in the region – Iran and Hezbollah – further exacerbates Assad’s difficulties and exacerbates the effects of Russian overreach. It also raises the question of whether Russia strategically misjudged the situation and underestimated its vulnerability in Syria.
But more importantly, it highlights Russia’s own dependence on allies who not only acquiesce to Moscow’s demands – as Assad did when he offered Russia military bases – but actively support a would-be A big country, but this country lacks some means to defend its claims.
Where is China?
What’s missing from the equation is China. Although Beijing sided with Assad as Syria’s civil war began, that support has been largely rhetorical. Its main purpose is to prevent a U.N.-backed, Western-led intervention similar to the one in Libya that led to Gaddafi’s fall and plunged the country into chaos ever since.
Assad made a high-profile visit to China in September 2023 and reached a strategic partnership agreement. At least in Beijing’s eyes, this appears to mark another step toward the Syrian regime’s revival. But when things came to a head and Assad’s rule was seriously threatened, China did nothing to save him.
This raises an important question about China’s judgment on the Syrian regime and the evolving crisis. But there is a broader point about Russia’s great power ambitions.
Despite constant talk of an open-ended partnership between Moscow and Beijing, China ultimately did nothing to salvage Russia’s embarrassing defeat in Syria.
Russia needs a military presence to consolidate its great power status, while China’s interests in the Middle East are mainly economic opportunities and the threat of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism.
This clearly limits Beijing’s willingness to engage further, let alone bail out Assad.
Putin’s decline
Russia’s position in the Middle East is now in jeopardy. Moscow has lost an important ally in Assad. Its other major allies, Iran and Hezbollah, have been significantly weakened. The Kremlin’s relations with Israel and Türkiye have not been easy over the past few years, but now their ties have strengthened.
This exposes the hollowness of Russia’s claims to great power status. It could also further undermine Russia’s prestige and its standing in the eyes of other partners—whether that’s China or North Korea, members of the BRICS, or the countries in the Global South that Russia has recently tried to woo.
The consequences for Ukraine, arguably the main source of Russian overreach, could be contradictory.
On the one hand, the fact that Assad was so easily overthrown shows that Russia is not invincible and that its support for brutal dictatorships has limits. On the other hand, nothing but Russia should be expected to double down on Ukraine.
Putin needs success to quickly restore domestic and international confidence in him. After all, Donald Trump doesn’t like losers.
Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
